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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
25 August 1955

TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Soviet-Communist Propaganda Highlights, 18-24  
August 1955

Standard Soviet propaganda lines since the summit conference continued to advertise the "realistic" approach of the USSR toward solving international disputes, and made special efforts to sound objective, sensible, and altruistic in all comment on international affairs.

Soviet output marked the close of the Geneva conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy by statements that the conference was not only a most important event in the scientific world but had also been "a further step toward the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust among states." The conference was described as "a brilliant example of the fruitfulness of contacts and exchanges of experience among scientists." An effort was made to play up the importance of continuing such contacts by stressing Bulganin's telegram to the closing session in which he advocated regular convocation of similar conferences, the post-conference session in Geneva, and the British invitation to a large group of participants, including Soviet scientists, to visit the British atomic research center at Harwell. References to the pre-eminence of the Soviet contributions were in general avoided in Soviet propaganda. A widely distributed Pravda article on 21 August mentioned foreign interest in the Soviet atomic power station and the Soviet section of the Geneva exhibition as being "the center of attention," but the emphasis was unmistakably on "the advancement of world co-operation" in the peaceful use of atomic energy. The Pravda editorial also managed to drag in, somewhat clumsily and very briefly, the world conference for the prohibition of nuclear weapons meeting in Japan, and the WPC appeal against the preparation of an atomic war.

Soviet propaganda on disarmament continued to emphasize the 10 May proposals, suggesting that they would be a realistic approach to the forthcoming UN discussions. Moscow never made a special issue of the 21 July disarmament proposal submitted by Bulganin at the Geneva conference of the heads of government, and it has not been mentioned for the past two weeks.

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The current line was best and most thoroughly expressed in an 18 August Pravda article by Marinin, who stressed that the possibilities for an agreement on disarmament are infinitely better since the Geneva conference. He recalled the failure of the League of Nations approach, but maintained that a new "vital force" is apparent in the current move for disarmament. He reiterated the absence of the necessary confidence in international relations, but argued that through "patient efforts" confidence can be achieved. He referred to the necessity of "developing confidence from below" and supplementing this by "definite actions from above."

Marinin mentioned President Eisenhower's proposal for a blueprints exchange but did not comment beyond Bulganin's Supreme Soviet statement.

Publicity for the cut in Soviet armed forces remained high, with emphasis on favorable foreign reaction. Indications of sensitivity toward Western depreciation of the move were still apparent in articles censuring Britain for asserting that the USSR controls six million men and for publishing "fabricated" figures, but no real clue as to the present size of the Soviet armed forces was given. Western allegations that the move testified to Soviet weakness prompted strong replies that it testified "to directly the opposite--to the might of the Soviet states."

Soviet broadcasts last week continued to hammer on the thesis that an all-European collective security system must be achieved before Germany can be unified and that a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany is an essential part of the unification process. Izvestia on 18 August contended that demands for a rapprochement are becoming "increasingly frequent" in West Germany and that this is a very significant indication of the prevailing moods in West Germany since the Geneva conference.

Moscow's treatment of the rapprochement theme makes it clear that one of the key elements in the Soviet campaign to isolate Chancellor Adenauer and to discredit his pro-Western policies is to encourage West Germans to believe that progress toward reunification is now more dependent on their own initiative than on agreement among the four great powers. Izvestia declared that it would be best if the German problem were solved by the Germans, "who undoubtedly are able to choose the right course for the development of Germany." But-tressing this line, Soviet comment on Adenauer's impending visit to Moscow has stressed the possibilities of normalizing

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economic and cultural relations but has avoided linking the reunification problem to a Moscow-Bonn rapprochement. The Soviet reply to Adenauer's 12 August note, agreeing to exchange views on unification but implying that such an exchange would be unproductive, received wide distribution but without comment.

Soviet-Satellite coverage of the eleventh anniversary of Rumania's liberation is extensive and speeches by Khrushchev and Gheorghiu-Dej are widely broadcast. The statements were routine, and aside from references by Gheorghiu-Dej to bettering relations with Yugoslavia and a host of other countries, dealt mainly with internal developments.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: AD, LI

Knight.

This is the memo that  
arrived in the office on Saturday  
that I mentioned to you on  
the phone

Don

29 Aug  
(DATE)

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